Why Secession is Unlike Brexit

This story is an exert from my long piece “The Case of Québec and Why Secession is Unlike Brexit”. I felt the need to publish this shorter version as it highlights the general conclusions of my longer article, but I nonetheless welcome you to read the full piece.

The idea that separatism is the same beast as Brexit is a pernicious and seemingly omnipresent myth. Despite this, the argument that the two are alike has been used in many states to demonize and subvert secessionism within their borders by comparing it with the most terrible forms of nativism. Many in Spain and the United Kingdom (UK), for example, denounce Catalan and Scottish separatism by comparing and equating them with Brexit as well. However, are these comparisons fair?

To begin with, lets talk about nationalism a bit more broadly. Firstly, it should be obvious to most that not all nationalisms are the same: being American, Canadian, Québécois, English, Scottish, French, Algerian, Ethiopian, Iranian, Mongolian, Thai or any other nationality is defined in different ways and using different concepts. To equate one with the other on the grounds that they are both instances of nationalism is, simply, wrong. After all, a particular nation’s nationalism finds its grounding using specific civic, culture, and historical touchstones; since secessionism grows from a nation’s wish for sovereignty, then we can understand it too deriving from these same touchstones. For example, Québec nationalism derives its definition from being the only North American territory in which French has remained the dominant language since the foundation of New France. Québec separatism, therefore, derives from the desire to protect and propagate the nation as defined by these particular touchstones. Brexit may similarly derive from the same sort of ambition for greater sovereignty, but does so using a particularly xenophobic and triumphalist reading of British, and in particular English, history that has nothing in common with the motivation or desired outcomes of Québec secession. Indeed, most secessionist movements in developed countries has similar ambitions: without exception, the separatist movements within the EU seek to maintain membership in the EU. If we think about what that means, the difference between Brexit and these cases of secession is obvious: if Catalonia, or example, were to gain independence within the EU, then there would remain no border between it and Spain and no barrier for Spanish people to live and work in Catalonia. A far cry from Brexit.

This is of course not to say that all cases of secessionism are always that of a benevolent movement made up of people aspiring to independence and openness. Each nation uses its own specific touch stones to define its character, a character which is articulated in its goals for secession. The political elite of Ireland, for example, favoured isolationism after winning independence. Moreover, I am also not arguing that there is a single conception of the nation within each nation. For example, there are indeed those in Québec who favour a racist definition of the nation that excludes all those who are not ethnically French (referred to in Québec with the code-word of Pure laine). The key, however, is to look at the dominate narratives within the conception of any given nation and define its motivation based on those, not based on the fringes. Therefore, if we compare the core national narratives of secession movements in places such as Québec, Scotland, and Catalonia, we find little that recommends a comparison with Brexit. The latter is an isolationist nationalism seeking to rekindle past glories, the former three all seek an open future which provides better for their respective nations cultural and economic interests. Brexit Britain finds better comparison with those nationalist movements seeking to revive a past golden age while erecting barriers against intrusion from outside entities and foreign nations, such as the Trumpian vision of American nationalism. As for secessionism, as always a better comparison for one case would be another: Québec has a lot more in common with Scotland and Catalonia than it does with Brexit Britain.

So why compare cases of secession with Brexit despite their lack of similarities? Just like those who over-indulge in arguments regarding the economic danger of independence (there are indeed dangers, but they are often exaggerated), such arguments are fundamentally about resisting change and maintaining the status quo. Looking back now, we can see these same sorts of arguments wielded against Ireland and Norway in their quests for independence — should they too have submissively accepted foreign rule? Indeed, the case of Norway is even more frustrating in that it gives us an example of how the dominant nation, in this case Sweden, can build a positive and mutually beneficial relationship with its seceding territory if it deals with separatism in an open manner. At the time of the 1995 referendum, there were no shortage of “experts” who posited that Canada would act harshly and vindictively towards an independent Québec, but this is merely a failure in imagination. As the Norway-Sweden case demonstrates, positive relationships between the separating and rump states can reduce the damage of secession and prove beneficial for both partners in the long term, while building open relationships and institutions that reduce the need for borders helps build national unity and negates the potential for secession to further splinter both states involved.

The most distinctive difference between Brexit and secession, the difference which ought to lead us to automatically reject any statement that the two are the same, is the fact that seceding territories lack sovereignty. Despite all the claims to the contrary, the UK never lost its sovereignty when it joined the EU. This is clearly illustrated by the very fact that the UK has the ability to unilaterally leave the EU. No sub-state nation possesses such a right. This is why Boris Johnson can simply say no to Scottish independence, why the Supreme Court of Canada stated that Quebec cannot unilaterally secede (though it does seem to have the right to unilaterally hold a referendum on secession), and why Spain can forceful shut down a Catalan referendum on independence. Sub-state nations such as these are not sovereign states, after all, and are not protected by any international laws. Instead, sub-state nations seeking independence are completely subject to the sovereignty of the state they are a part of. Brussels has no comparative power over the UK, it only has power over the obligations which the UK has agreed to fulfill as part of its membership to the EU.

Ultimately, there is little to commend us to believe that secession and Brexit have anything in common. I have taken the time here to draw some general conclusions on secession and nationalism in the hope that the sort of arguments which conflate secessionism and Brexit will not be used in the future to mislead people into misinterpreting the politics of yesterday or today. Rather, I hope political discourse favouring openness, both in spirit and practice, will prevail.