A Road-map to Independence

A while back I wrote a piece entitled “What does it take to Secede?” In it, I attempted to further develop Stephan Dion’s criteria for secession that he laid down in his article “Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies?” However, the criteria that I outlined were mostly environmental, factors which needed to be present for a secessionist movement to stand a chance of succeeding. As such, I didn’t truly answer the question I set out for myself in the article’s title. I wish to remedy that problem, though my ability to fix this issue are limited. After all, there is no set playbook to achieving independence, no actions that a separatist movement can take to guarantee itself victory. This makes sense, as every movement is based upon a distinct (national) identity that will require a different, tailored approach if it is to succeed. However, there are certainly some generalized guidelines, a road-map, that can be set down which, in today’s world, are more likely to lead to a victory for secessionists.

Firstly, it is important to emphasize the uniqueness of the region. If secessionists are to succeed, it must not only be possible to differentiate the secessionist region from the state, it must be impossible not to recognize the differences. First and foremost, this means cultivating the regional culture as something distinct from that of the larger state. Things that make the region distinct, such as language, literature, food, art, etc., must all be encouraged. It is often best to focus on a particular key element, whatever the central focus of the culture, and fortify that. Quebec, for example, put a great deal of energy into entrenching and growing the French language as the defining characteristic of Quebecois identity. However, such cultural distinctions are not enough, as a secessionist movement will also need to ensure that there is a different politics in the sub-state region. Wales is a good illustration of how a region can be culturally distinct, but lack politically distinction from the larger state and therefore also lack the political appetite for secessionism. To avoid this, secessionists must ensure that the region’s politics represents the sub-state region by tailoring the political discourse around those issues distinct to that particular region. It also helps for secessionists to adopt politics that are progressive in nature, unless the national cultural is particularly conservative, as if the secessionist movement is able to prove that it is more progressive than the stat then that will help to also emphasize the movement’s modernity.

Secondly, a secessionist movement must cultivate grassroots leadership if it is to succeed in the long term. As it grows and gains momentum, people will want to support the secessionist movement. The key is allowing them to do so. While maintaining the messaging of the movement centrally, it is best to ensure that there are avenues through which individual citizens can act in support of the secessionist movement. This will help to galvanize support (as people like being involved), bolster the odds of success, and grow future leaders. This last criterion is particularly important, as secession is often a lengthy process and will require long term thinking if it is to succeed. Such thinking, for example, was instrumental in ensuring that the Scottish National party survived the difficult decades of the 70s and 80s and emerge with strong leadership in post-2000.

Thirdly, secessionist movements must incorporate diversity. In every place on earth there is cultural and ethnic diversity, and secessionist’s must recognize that their sub-state region is no exception. These diverse minority groups which exist within the region must be tapped in to if success in the long term (which includes the formation of a healthy state post-secession) is to occur, and this means abandoning any ethnic basis for the movement. Ethnonationalism is both morally bankrupt and a losing strategy to take in liberal societies. We saw this on display when, after the defeat of the 1995 separatist referendum in Quebec, Jacques Parizeau declared that separatists had lost the referendum due to “money and ethnic votes”. Though his statement was divisive, it is largely correct in its assessment and illustrates the failure of Quebec separatists to incorporate immigrants into their movement. As such, it is important to incorporate minority groups into the movement and make them feel at home within the movement. This will likely help in the long term as well, as encouraging them to fight for secessionism may also encourage them to embrace the regional identity and help create proof of the ability of the regional sub-state to be open and flexible to diversity while simultaneously giving incentive to minorities to integrate fluidly into the regional sub-state’s culture. This will bolster the chance of the secessionist movement’s success as well as help create a stronger post-secessionist society.

Finally, it is important for a movement to gain internal allies. Foreign support is of course always good, but when facing a strong central government nothing beats having internal allies with which to band together. This is particularly good if those internal allies are other similarly-minded regional sub-states that have similar interests in devolution or independence. This way a region is never negotiating for devolution or independence alone, but with allies and from a stronger position. We saw how effective this could be during Spain’s transition away from Franco-ism, where Catalans, Basques, and Galatians were able to force Madrid’s hand on issues such as regional language rights by banding together and voicing their desires as a block. On a grander scale, this is also exemplified at the EU level, where various regionalist and separatist parties throughout Europe have formed the European Free Alliance to give themselves communally a much greater voice than they would have independently. Moreover, such alliances may help bolster the prospects of weaker movements and give them a greater deal of credibility and strength than they would have by themselves, as is the case with Wale’s Plaid Cymru who benefits a great deal from their close links with the much larger and more successful Scottish Nationalist Party.

These four components of the secessionist road-map are obviously not the only requirements nor are they per say always required. Rather, they make up the four points which I believe a secessionist movement must adhere to if it wishes not only to succeed, but also to build a better state when it has. This is makes it a road-map to true independence, and independence founded on inclusivity and interconnectivity, not petty ethnonationalist isolation. As such, it is also in many ways a manifesto for how I hope the future can look, one where nations can be free to exercise their right to self-determination while also never erecting barriers.